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RECENT ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
CONCERNING THE AUTHORITY OF HOME RULE
UNITS TO CONTROL LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS
Robert S. Minetz*
Five and one-half years ago, Illinois' new constitution became
effective. One of the goals of the constitution was to provide
greater autonomy for local governments by granting home rule
powers. In the area of control of environmental problems, how-
ever, the Illinois Supreme Court has severely limited the power
of home rule units. Mr. Minetz traces the development of home
rule law relating to environmental problems and criticizes re-
strictions on local regulation.
The citizens of Illinois convened a constitutional convention in
1970 to review and reconsider their 100-year-old constitution.
After great effort and substantial debate, a proposal was drafted
which subsequently was accepted by the voters of this State.' The
new constitution became effective on July 1, 1971 and it now
stands as both the cornerstone of Illinois law and a national
model. The role of effectuating the intent of the framers of the
constitution then devolved upon the state judiciary. A number of
years have passed since the formation of the constitution and it
is now an appropriate time to determine whether the broad ideals
and goals of the constitutional convention have been applied
faithfully to the myriad of situations which have faced the courts.
One of the primary issues before the 1970 convention was the
proper relationship between state and local governments and the
amount of autonomy which should be conferred upon cities,
towns, and villages.3 Many authorities believed that it was imper-
* B.A., DePaul University; J.D., cum laude, University of Illinois. The author is a
member of the law firm of Di Leonardi & O'Brien, Ltd., which represented the City of
Des Plaines in the home rule decisions discussed in this Article.
1. The 1970 constitution of the State of Illinois was adopted at a special election on
December 15, 1970. For an exhaustive article detailing the history of the drafting of the
constitution and the local government article, see Anderson & Lousin, From Bone Gap to
Chicago: A History of the Local Government Article of the 1970 Constitution, 9 J. MAR.
J. PR~c. & PRo. 698 (1976).
2. Section 1 of Adoption Schedule of the Ill. Const. See Transition Schedule for effective
dates of other sections of the constitution which become effective at various times.
3. See Biebel, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An Uncertain Beginning, 6 J.
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ative for local units of government to receive greater power and
autonomy to solve growing urban problems.4 Thus, Illinois de-
cided to follow other states and adopt the concept of "home
rule." 5 The local government provision of the 1970 constitution is
article VII. Section 6 of this article defines the powers granted to
home rule units6 and is the heart of the local government provi-
sion.
The clear purpose of home rule was to expand the powers of
municipal governments from their previous narrow scope of au-
MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 253, 253-54 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Biebel]; CONSTITUTION
RESEARCH GROUP, CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 251-66
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH GROUP].
4. CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 3, at 263-65. Mr. Louis Ancel, an at-
torney and an expert in urban affairs, presented the following relevant testimony to the
Commission on Urban Area Government on Sept. 17, 1969:
The problems of police and fire protection, polluted air, befouled streams and
waters, noise, traffic, littered streets, crime and vandalism, slums, obsolescence,
inadequate mass transportation, garbage disposal, zoning, planning, recreation,
open-space, urban sprawl, and the great human and social problems, to name
but a few-require the tools, the power, and the flexibility on the municipal level
in order to effectuate their solution. Adequate solutions cannot be derived from
our present method of piecemeal delegated grants of legislative power narrowly
construed.
This statement provides a good brief description of the principal reasons home rule au-
thority was advocated as a solution to some of the pressing local problems in Illinois. See
also SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1603-11, 1614-
16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]; Ancel, 20th Century Powers for 20th Cen-
tury Cities: Constitutional Municipal Home Rule in Illinois, 49 CHI. B. REc. 226 (1968).
Contra, PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 1611-14.
5. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §6(a) generally described home rule units:
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the county
and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule
units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units.
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
Illinois did more than merely follow the lead of other states that had earlier adopted
home rule provisions. Illinois conferred a grant of authority to home rule units which was
probably the broadest in the country. Parkhurst, Article VII - Local Government, 52 CHI.
B. REc. 94, 99 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Parkhurst].
For a discussion of a model home rule provision and a review of home rule throughout
the nation, see Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA
(NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1975).
6. John Parkhurst, chairman of the convention's Local Government Committee, called
this article the "boldest and most innovative part of the new package." Parkhurst, supra
note 5, at 94.
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
thority.7 Prior to the adoption of the recent constitution, Illinois,
like most other jurisdictions,' had been controlled by the famous
doctrine known as Dillon's Rule.' Thus, cities, towns and villages
could exercise only those specific and limited powers conferred
upon them by the state legislature. The Record of Proceedings of
the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention shows that the fra-
mers of the new constitution intended to reverse the presumption
against local authority and establish a new presumption in favor
of municipal rule."0 New article VII provides that a home rule unit
may "perform any function pertaining to its government and af-
fairs"" unless the General Assembly specifically limits the au-
thority of the municipality. The subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion and development of this constitutional grant of power to
municipal government and the preemption of this authority by
state action are the principal subject matters of this review.
The new provisions of home rule power are quite simple. Sec-
tion 6(a) confers a broad grant of power 2 on home rule units.
Sections 6(g) and (h) of article VII allow the General Assembly
to prevent local entities from acting in particular areas of govern-
ment; however, these sections also require the General Assembly
to express its intent in a prescribed manner. The General Assem-
bly by a three-fifths vote of the members of each house may deny
7. See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §10.09 (rev. ed. 1966).
8. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137 (1972); PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 1604-05; Froehlich, Illinois
Home Rule In The Courts, 63 ILL. B.J. 320 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Froehlich]. See,
e.g., Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 III.2d 582, 584, 198 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1964).
9. 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPS. §237, at 448-50 (5th ed. 1911) states:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply
convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concern-
ing the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and
the power is denied.
See also City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R. R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
10. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 1593-94. See Baum, supra note 8, at 138; Biebel, supra
note 3, at 257, 271-72, 282-83.
11. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §6(a).
12. Id. See note 5 supra, for text. See also Vitullo, Local Government: Recent Develop-
ments in Local Government Law in Illinois, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 86 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Vitullo].
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or limit home rule powers which are not exercised by the state. 13
The General Assembly also may provide specifically by law for
exclusive state jurisdiction in areas of state concern or activity.1
Sections 6(i) and (m) of article VII provide two aids to judicial
construction of the home rule provisions of the constitution. Sec-
tion 6(i) declares that the state and home rule units may act
concurrently in areas in which the General Assembly has not
specifically limited the concurrent exercise of power or specifi-
cally declared the state's exercise to be exclusive. Section 6(m)
states that the powers and functions of home rule units shall be
liberally construed. Thus, a fair reading of section 6 strongly sug-
gests that home rule authority is presumed unless the General
Assembly acts to divest local government of power. The constitu-
tional convention left no room for any implied preemption by
state action. 5
The most difficult questions concerning the proper relationship
between a home rule unit and the state and its agencies have
arisen in environmental matters. Specifically, the issues have
been whether the Illinois Environmental Protection Act" has
preempted the right of home rule cities to legislate on issues with
environmental impact and whether the broad grant of power con-
ferred on home rule units by section 6(a) includes the power to
legislate on environmental problems. If one reads the constitution
literally, the answer is simple. Since the General Assembly has
13. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §6(g).
14. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §6(h) (emphasis added).
15. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 1622, 1941-46; Vitullo, supra note 12, at 91. But
see Chutgach Electric Ass'n v. City of Anchorage, 476 P.2d 115 (Alas. 1970). Interpreting
a state constitution with a broad grant of home rule power, the Alaska Supreme Court in
Chutgach Electric Ass'n expressed its opinion that the legislature need not specifically
state its legislative intent to prevent the exercise of power by a home rule unit. Instead,
the Alaska Supreme Court found state preemption through the state's exercise of power
in a particular field. The decision in Chutgach Electric Ass'n should not be regarded as
authority for implied preemption in Illinois.
The theory of preemption by implication is contrary to the preemption procedure out-
lined by art. VII, §6 of the Illinois Constitution and specifically opposed to §6(i) which
requires concurrent jurisdiction absent specific state limitation. Moreover, the Alaska
Supreme Court cited but failed to follow the contrary arguments of Prof. Chester Antieau,
1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §292.38 (1968), which opposed the doctrines
of "implied preemption" or "occupation of the field." 476 P.2d at 120 n.16 and accompa-
nying text. Antieau's position is better reasoned and more consistent with the Illinois
Constitution. See also text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§1011 et seq. (1975).
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never specifically provided that the state would act exclusively in
environmental matters pursuant to section 6(h), the city and
state could act concurrently pursuant to the command of section
6(i). Also, the grant of power conferred by section 6(a) allows
home rule units to perform any function and exercise any power
pertaining to its government and affairs and specifically includes
the power to regulate for the public health, safety and welfare.
Thus, section 6(a) would seem to allow local legislation to help
solve environmental problems. The highest court of Illinois has
not followed this simple logic.
The first important decision concerning the proper scope of the
constitutional grant of power to home rule units in environmental
matters was City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board. 17 In this
case, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illi-
nois Pollution Control Board appealed an order which enjoined
them from enforcing the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago offered a number
of bases" for its claim that it was not subject to this state regula-
tion. Chicago argued that the city is a home rule unit under
article VII of the constitution and the collection and disposal of
garbage and waste is a governmental function within its home
rule powers. Also, the City of Chicago explained that the General
Assembly had not acted pursuant to article VII to restrict the
city's exercise of its home rule powers. The state agencies claimed
that the state has exclusive authority in the area of environmen-
tal protection pursuant to article XI of the 1970 constitution" and
the Environmental Protection Act. Also, they argued that envi-
ronmental and pollution matters are not matters of concern for
local governments within the meaning of section 6(a).20
The Illinois Supreme Court unanimously held that the City of
Chicago must comply with the provisions of the Illinois Environ-
17. 59 Ill.2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974). See also Schick, Illinois Home Rule in the Courts
-Continued, 65 ILL. B.J. 214 (1976).
18. Id. at 486, 322 N.E.2d at 13. The city never claimed that state agencies could not
regulate non-municipal entities within its borders.
19. ILL. CONST. art. XI, §1 provides:
Public Policy-Legislative Responsibility
The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to provide and
maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations.
The General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and enforce-
ment of this public policy.
20. 59 Ill.2d at 486, 322 N.E.2d at 13.
[Vol. 26:306
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mental Protection Act.2 In order to arrive at its decision, the
court thoroughly reviewed article XI of the state constitution, the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, the Record of Proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention and the committees' reports
concerning articles VII and XI.22 The court noted that the state
had legislated in the field of environmental law but had not ex-
pressed its intention to exclude local legislative efforts. Thus, the
court's opinion concluded:
[A] local governmental unit may legislate concurrently with
the General Assembly on environmental control. However, ...
such legislation by a local governmental unit must conform with
the minimum standards established by the legislature."
This statement of law contains two important ingredients.
First, the supreme court was willing to effectuate section 6(m) of
article VII of the constitution and allow concurrent jurisdiction
21. Id. at 490, 322 N.E.2d at 15.
22. Justice Ryan, writing for the unanimous court in City of Chicago v. Pollution
Control Board, 59 Ill.2d at 488-89, 322 N.E.2d at 14, described the apparent intent of the
state legislature not to preempt the environmental field. He carefully examined the com-
mittee reports of the constitutional convention and explained:
Thus it would appear that although the committee intended that the General
Assembly should provide the leadership and establish uniform standards with
regard to pollution control it was not the intention of the committee that the
local government units be prohibited from acting in this field. It was instead the
intention of the committee that under the leadership of the General Assembly
the intergovernmental efforts complement one another.
This conclusion also appears to be in accord with the opinion of the Local
Government Committee as stated in its report. In discussing exclusive and non-
exclusive exercises of State power the committee stated:
"Control of air and water pollution flood plains and sewage treatment
are often cited as important examples of areas requiring regional or
statewide standards and control.
At the same time, it is quite conceivable that both the state and
various local governments can regulate the same activities and carry
on the same or related functions without conflict or difficulty." 7
Proceedings 1642-1643.
The committee further indicated (7 Proceedings 1643) that the proposal makes
clear that if the State legislates but does not express exclusivity, local govern-
mental units retain the power to act concurrently, subject to limitations pro-
vided by law.
The evaluation of the problem in this case is the most exhaustive review by the Illinois
Supreme Court on this question. Nevertheless, this conclusion was eventually repudiated
by divided opinions in Carlson v. Village of Worth, and Des Plaines v. Metropolitan
Sanitary District. See notes 41 & 60 and accompanying text infra.
23. 59 Ill.2d at 489, 322 N.E.2d at 14-15.
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absent a specific action by the General Assembly. Second, the
court decided that the state has superior authority in case of
conflict in areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Initially, the decision
that the state had superior authority over a home rule unit in case
of conflict seemed to be the only controversial portion of the
opinion. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions have shown that the
issue of concurrent jurisdiction in environmental matters was not
as settled as many believed.
The supreme court's decision in Pollution Control Board gave
precedence to the state over local authorities in environmental
matters. This portion of the opinion is contrary to a line of Illinois
Supreme Court decisions24 which hold that state statutes adopted
prior to the 1970 constitution and in conflict with the subsequent
exercise of home rule powers are invalid to the extent of the
conflict.25 The Illinois Environmental Protection Act was effective
July 1, 19705 - one full year before the effective date of the new
constitution." If the prior line of cases had been followed, the pre-
constitution statute would not limit home rule powers. Though
the act has been reviewed on numerous occasions since its adop-
tion and since the effective date of the new constitution, the
legislature has never provided specifically for exclusive state ju-
risdiction.2
The Illinois Supreme Court in two subsequent decisions,
Mulligan v. Dunne" and Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley,"° reaffirmed
its statement in Pollution Control Board that the state and home
rule units could legislate concurrently on environmental mat-
ters." The court in Mulligan had the occasion to consider whether
a county tax on the retail sale of alcoholic beverages violated
24. Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill.2d 10 (1976); Peters v. City of Spring-
field, 57 Ill.2d 142, 147-49, 311 N.E.2d 107, 110-11 (1974); Clarke v. Arlington Heights,
57 I1.2d 50, 53-54, 309 N.E.2d 576, 578-79 (1974); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54
Ill.2d 561, 565-66, 301 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1973); Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill.2d 161,
166-67, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243-44 (1972).
25. Froehlich, supra note 8, at 320.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111-2, §§1001 et seq. (1975).
27. See note 2 supra.
28. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§1004, 1005, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1031, 1033, 1035,
1036, 1039, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1046 (1973).
29. 61 Ill.2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975).
30. 61 Ill.2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
31. See Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.2d 537, 543, 338 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1975); Mulligan
v. Dunne, 61 Ill.2d 544, 549, 338 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1975).
[Vol. 26:306
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section 6 of article VII of the constitution. The challengers raised
a number of issues. They claimed that the "state's extensive tax-
ation and regulation of the liquor industry. . . demonstrate that
the subject matter of the ordinance is one of statewide interest
which does not pertain to the government and affairs of Cook
County within the meaning of section 6(a)."31 The court treated
this challenge as a claim that the matter was not one of local
concern within section 6(a) and that the state has preempted
control of the liquor industry within the meaning of section 6(h).
The plaintiff liquor dealers relied on Pollution Control Board
to support their position. The court explained that the situation
in Mulligan was not analogous to the Pollution Control Board
case. Also, the court declared that it had indicated in Pollution
Control Board "that a home rule unit could legislate concurrently
with the General Assembly on environmental control;" however,
local ordinances would be required to meet state standards. Ulti-
mately, the court in Mulligan held that there was no preemption
since a statute which purported to restrict home rule powers must
specifically indicate the intention to preempt. For this proposi-
tion, the court cited Rozner v. Korshak,34 and sections 6(i) and
(m) of article VII of the constitution." Thus, the court disagreed
with the plaintiff's contention that extensive state legislation in
a particular area may make the area one of state, and not local,
concern within the meaning of section 6(a) and that an extensive
regulatory scheme could act as an implied or constructive
preemption within the meaning of sections 6(g) and (h).
At about the same time as the decision in Mulligan, the su-
preme court decided Ampersand and again affirmed in dicta its
position in Pollution Control Board that home rule units could
legislate concurrently with state agencies in environmental
areas.36 The issue in Ampersand was whether a $2.00 library fee
charged against all parties filing pleadings was a valid exercise of
home rule authority. The plaintiff claimed that a home rule unit
had no authority to impose a filing fee as a condition precedent
to a litigant's right to use the state judicial system. The defen-
32. 61 Il.2d at 548, 338 N.E.2d at 9.
33. Id. at 549, 338 N.E.2d at 10.
34. 55 I1.2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1975).
35. 61 Ill.2d at 550-51, 338 N.E.2d at 11.
36. Id. at 543, 338 N.E.2d at 19.
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dant in Ampersand attempted to use the Pollution Control Board
decision to support its position that the state and county could
act concurrently in this area.37 The court distinguished the situa-
tion in Pollution Control Board and held that the state constitu-
tion made establishment of a unified court system an area of
exclusive state interest and concern. The court explained that the
"interest here differs from that of the state in City of Chicago v.
Pollution Control Board. . . . There we held that the interest of
the state was not such as to preclude a home rule unit from
acting, but permitted concurrent actions by the state and local
governmental units.""
The law in this state would seem to have been well settled after
the Illinois Supreme Court's statements in Pollution Control
Board, Mulligan and Ampersand that home rule units could leg-
islate on environmental matters. Nevertheless, subsequent deci-
sions reveal that the law on this question was still in its develop-
mental state even after these pronouncements. Moreover, state-
ments made by the Illinois Supreme Court in a non-home rule
case, Carlson v. Village of Worth,3" indicated that the court was
beginning to retreat from its prior position upholding the rights
of local governments to legislate on environmental matters.
Justice Schaefer, writing on behalf of a divided court, opened
the opinion in Carlson with a statement of the issue:
This case concerns the authority of a non-home rule municipal-
ity to superimpose the requirements of its own "environmental
protection ordinance" upon the holder of a permit for the opera-
tion of a sanitary landfill issued by the State Environmental
Protection Agency pursuant to the Environmental Protection
Act. 0
The court then held that local regulation of a sanitary landfill was
preempted by the Environmental Protection Act of 1970. Since
no home rule unit was involved in the Carlson case, the court had
no need to discuss whether home rule units and state agencies
could act concurrently in matters of environmental concern. Nev-
37. Id. at 543, 338 N.E.2d at 18-19.
38. Id. at 543, 338 N.E.2d at 19.
39. 62 Ill.2d 406, 409, 343 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1975) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (supplemental
opinion on denial of rehearing issued on Feb. 5, 1976) (Ward, Ryan, Underwood, J.J.,
dissenting on denial of rehearing).
40. Id. at 407, 343 N.E.2d at 494.
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ertheless, Justice Schaefer stated that the court's previous con-
clusion in Pollution Control Board "that a local governmental
unit may legislate concurrently with the General Assembly on
environmental control" was dicta.4 1
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently issued a supplemen-
tal opinion in Carlson and denied a request for rehearing. One of
the briefs in support of a rehearing was filed by the Illinois Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. The agency argued that since the
Pollution Control Board had not adopted any standards concern-
ing sanitary landfills, local governments should be able to exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction. The supreme court rejected this con-
tention. Thus, the court told the Environmental Protection
Agency that it had exclusive authority and jurisdiction, ready or
not.
The majority of the court in Carlson explained that the General
Assembly, by passing the Environmental Protection Act pre-
empted local authority. This statement is contrary to section
6(h) of the constitution which requires the General Assembly to
specifically provide for an exclusive exercise of any power. This
conclusion also seems contrary to sections 6(i) and (m) of article
VII which favor concurrent jurisdiction and a liberal construction
of home rule power. Moreover, the pronouncement that the 1970
Environmental Protection Act controlled the subsequently ap-
proved 1970 constitution is clearly opposed to the line of Illinois
Supreme Court cases holding that statutes enacted before pas-
41. Id. at 409, 343 N.E.2d at 495. The court's labeling its previous statements as dicta
does not mean these statements have absolutely no precedential value as a matter of
Illinois law. The pronouncements in Pollution Control Board, Ampersand and Mulligan
were issued only after careful analysis of the home rule questions at issue in each case.
Also, the court's statements in each of these instances were in response to arguments of
counsel on issues raised in these cases and were, therefore, judicial dicta with precedential
value. The leading cases in Illinois on judicial dicta were summaried and exemplified in
Larson v. Johnson, 1 III.App.2d 36, 116 N.E.2d 187 (1st Dist. 1954), which held:
If the opinion expressed on a legal question is one casually reached by the court
on an issue unrelated to the essence of the controversy or based on hypothetical
facts, then it is obiter dictum. If, however, the question involved is one of a
number of legal issues presented by the facts of that particular case, the court's
decision on that question is not dictum even though it be the last ground of
many decided by the court, all in support of its final conclusion . . . . Our
Supreme Court has made a distinction between judicial dictum and obiter
dictum, meaning that a legal principle deliberately passed upon by a court
establishes a precedent. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 462, 470.
Id. at 40, 116 N.E.2d at 189.
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sage of the constitution are invalid to the extent of conflict with
subsequently enacted home rule ordinances.42
The dissents in Carlson3 made a number of important points
and posed numerous interesting questions which were left unan-
swered by the majority of the court. First, Justice Ryan stated
that any preemption that may have been implied in the Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1970 did not survive after the effective
date of the recent constitution." In addition, Justice Ryan con-
ducted a review of Illinois law which revealed that Illinois munici-
pal governments always have been able to regulate on environ-
mental matters. A number of cases have held that a city's police
power gives it the right to control garbage, noise and air pollu-
tion." Also, local units of government long have had the statutory
authority to abate environmental and other nuisances."
It remained to be seen after Carlson whether the Illinois Su-
preme Court really meant to deprive cities of the power to control
environmental problems by forbidding them to legislate on the
matter. This approach clearly would be contrary to the 1970 con-
stitution which attempted to broaden rather than limit the power
of municipalities. 7 It seemed that the Illinois Supreme Court in
Carlson might simply have been careless when it used language
indicating that a home rule unit might be unable to legislate to
solve problems related to the environment. The term "environ-
mental" encompasses so many areas of local concern (dirt, noise,
odor, etc.) that a state cannot have meaningful home rule if mu-
42. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra. Further evidence that the decision
in Carlson v. Village of Worth should have no bearing on the home rule issue is found in
the Illinois Supreme Court's complete reliance in Carlson on its earlier decision in
O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill.2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972). The O'Connor decision,
like the Carlson holding, never discussed the power of a home rule unit. Moreover, the
O'Connor decision, like the Carlson case, involved zoning and no environmental ordi-
nances. Thus, it is difficult to contend that either O'Connor or Carlson is precedent for
the proposition that a home rule unit is powerless to regulate on environmental matters
within its boundaries.
43. 62 Ill.2d at 411-14, 418-26, 343 N.E.2d at 496-98, 500-04 (Ward, C.J., and Under-
wood and Ryan, J.J., dissenting).
44. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
45. 62 Ill.2d at 420-23, 343 N.E.2d at 501. See also Carpentersville Ready Mix Co. v.
Carpentersville, 39 Ill.App.3d 840, 350 N.E.2d 508 (2d Dist. 1976) (city may properly enact
ordinance to reduce noises, fumes and vibrations).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-60-2 (1975). See also id. §11-19-5 (power of city to provide
for method of garbage disposal).
47. See notes 7-15 and accompanying text supra.
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nicipal governments are deprived of control over environmental
questions. It is important to also note that there has been no
indication from the legislature that it meant to preempt the field
of environmental control. If the General Assembly desires to
preempt an area of local concern, the court must require a specific
statement pursuant to section 6(h) of article VII of the 1970
constitution. Moreover, the legislature should not take a preemp-
tive step in the field of environmental control until it is ready and
able to fund a project designed to protect the residents of each
and every town, city and village from the numerous environmen-
tal problems of ordinary daily life."
One issue remained after Carlson: Was the dicta in Pollution
Control Board or the dicta in Carlson which labeled the Pollution
Control Board statement as dicta the law in Illinois? The Illinois
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des
Plaines49 had an opportunity finally to decide whether the right
of a home rule unit to legislate in environmental matters had
been preempted by the state. The court failed to take this oppor-
tunity and decided the case on another ground. The factual issue
presented was the constitutional right of the city, a home rule
unit, to regulate the construction or operation of a sewage treat-
ment plant being constructed within the city's borders by a spe-
cial district. The trial court had ruled that the district was
obliged to comply with reasonable provisions of the city's health
ordinance which were not inconsistent with the conditions im-
posed by the Environmental Protection Agency.5" The supreme
48. Professor Baum explained in an early article on the subject of preemption of home
rule powers, that the 1970 constitution makes it the role of the legislature, and not of the
court, to preempt. Baum, supra note 8, at 157. See also Baum, A Tentative Survey of
Illinois Home Rule (Part II): Legislative Control Transitions, and Intergovernmental
Conflict, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 559, 579 (1972). He contended that the specific inclusion in
section 6(a) of "the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals
and welfare. ... was designed to prevent judicial erosion of the municipal power to
exercise the police power. Baum, supra note 8, at 141. Also, judicial preemption was at
odds with the thrust of the Illinois Constitution which favors concurrent exercise of power
and attempts to avoid implied preemption by judicial decision. Baum (Part II), supra, at
579.
49. 63 Ill.2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976) (Ward and Ryan, J.J., dissenting; Schaeffer,
J., taking no part) (opinion modified and petition for rehearing denied on May 27, 1976).
50. Id. at 258, 347 N.E.2d at 717. The trial court's memorandum opinion was rendered
by the Honorable Samuel B. Epstein in consolidated cases 75 L 3818 and 75 CH 5742 (Cir.
Ct. of Cook County, Ill., Oct. 29, 1975).
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court reversed5 and changed its approach to the entire question
of the right of home rule units to legislate on environmental is-
sues. The focus shifted from the preemption question to the ques-
tion of whether a home rule city had the power pursuant to article
VII, section 6(a) to pass laws touching on the environment. 2
The district asserted two grounds in support of its position that
it was not subject to local regulation. First, it claimed that envi-
ronmental regulation of a sewage treatment plant is a matter of
statewide concern and therefore not within the local government
and affairs provision of section 6(a). The district also claimed
that the city's regulation had been wholly preempted by the En-
vironmental Protection Act. The Illinois Supreme Court only de-
cided the first question and held that the city's health ordinance
which was designed to regulate the potentially dangerous facility
within its borders was not a function pertaining to the city's
government and affairs.
The court's principal objection to the city's legislation was that
"to permit a regional district to be regulated by a part of that
region is incompatible with the purpose for which it is created."5
In addition, the court was concerned that other parts of the region
may adopt inconsistent regulations. 4 The bases of the court's
51. It must be noted that one possible explanation for the court's decision was the
particular dispute at issue. The court had previously decided two other cases involving
the same parties and project. See Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill.2d
11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (1971); Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 59 ll.2d 29, 319
N.E.2d 9 (1974). Thus, the court may have been attempting to remain consistent with its
previous holdings allowing the Metropolitan Sanitary District to build its sewage plant
without any regulation by the City of Des Plaines. One must wonder if a different decision
would have been reached if the issue had been the right of the Chicago Housing Authority
to build a low income housing project in a wealthy suburb.
52. Earlier commentators recognized that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Bridgman v. Korzen, 54 Ill.2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972), spelled trouble for the intended
broad construction of art. VII, §6(a). The court in Bridgman held that the collection of
taxes by Cook County on behalf of all taxing bodies in the county was not a home rule
power. Biebel, supra note 3, at 263-64, 330 (citing Professors Baum & Cohn). Compare
Biebel, supra note 3, with Note, The "Clean Slate" Doctrine: A Liberal Construction of
the Scope of the Illinois Home Rule Powers-Kanellos v. County of Cook, 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1298, 1299 (1974) (author predicting that Illinois Supreme Court has "assured that
home rule powers will not be narrowly circumscribed").
53. 63 Ill.2d at 261, 347 N.E.2d at 719.
54. Id. The court's concern about inconsistent legislation by the various home rule units
which comprise the District was not warranted. The facts of the case did not involve this
type of conflict. Also, it would seem reasonable that the interest of the City of Des Plaines
would be superior to the interest of other home rule units because the plant was planned
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ultimate decision do not survive careful scrutiny. The court's
characterization of the city's ordinance as an attempt to regulate
a special district is improper. The ordinance did not single out
special districts. Instead, the city's ordinance was an attempt to
regulate any and all potentially dangerous sewage works within
its borders. The ownership of the source of pollution was not
crucial. The real section 6(a) issue was whether or not the city's
passage of a health ordinance to regulate the environmental ef-
fects of a potentially dangerous treatment facility within its
boundaries was "a power or function pertaining to its government
and affairs" within the meaning of section 6(a). The answer to
this question is that nothing is of more local concern than pollu-
tion and, therefore, the Des Plaines pollution regulation was a
proper power to be exercised by a home rule unit. The right of a
home rule unit to legislate on environmental matters is prescribed
by section 6(a) which specifically provides that "the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare" is conferred on home rule units.
The court's conclusion in Metropolitan Sanitary District that
a special district was not subject to regulation by a home rule unit
gives special districts absolute authority to impose their will on
home rule municipalities. This conclusion was not warranted. A
home rule municipality ranks only behind state government in
the hierarchy of power in this state. Only the General Assembly
may limit the powers of home rule governments. The 1970 consti-
tution granted broad power and authority to home rule units and
continued to confer only limited rights on special districts. 5
Thus, the court's judgment which gave preference to the special
district in its activities within the corporate boundaries of the
home rule unit was contrary to the hierarchy established by the
1970 constitution. The court implied an additional grant of power
to special districts that the constitutional convention refused or
neglected to confer."5
for Des Plaines and Des Plaines residents were most likely to be harmed by any adverse
environmental impact.
55. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §8. See Baum (Part II), supra note 48, at 586-87; Helman &
Whalen, SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT., CONST. art. VII, app. 8, at 85 (1971) (Dillon's Rule
remains applicable to special districts).
56. Compare the preference given to special districts over home rule units in this case,
with the dissents of Justices Underwood, Schaefer and Davis in City of Evanston v.
County of Cook, 53 Ill.2d 312, 319-24, 291 N.E.2d 823, 827-30 (1972), expressing the
opinion that home rule units have greater power than county governments.
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The late Professor Baum, counsel to the Home Rule Committee
of the constitutional convention, had occasion to specifically
study the potential problem of a conflict between a home rule
unit and a special district. 7 His analysis reached an opposite
conclusion to the decision by the supreme court in Metropolitan
Sanitary District. He explained that the home rule provisions of
the constitution do not affect special districts. Thus, special dis-
tricts remain subject to strict legislative control. Professor Baum
then contrasted the status of special districts with the broad new
authority conferred by the constitution on home rule govern-
ments. He concluded that home rule units may regulate special
districts as they do other actions affecting their residents pur-
suant to the powers granted in section 6(a).
It is important to realize that the supreme court decided
Metropolitan Sanitary District with no evidence that the local
regulation would hamper the effectiveness of the special district. 8
Moreover, the court reversed a limited trial court order which
held that the district was subject only to "reasonable" provisions
which were not inconsistent with the permit conditions imposed
by the State Environmental Protection Agency.59 The court's
usurpation of home rule authority without the showing of any
57. Baum (Part 11), supra note 48, at 586-87. Professor Baum explained his reasoning:
Less clear is the power of home rule units to regulate the activities of special
districts operating within their boundaries. Before home rule became the law in
Illinois, special districts often operated within a municipality without comply-
ing with applicable municipal regulations. Several cases held that special dis-
tricts need not comply with local zoning restrictions when acquiring property
and building facilities appropriate to their statutory purposes. The advent of
home rule does not specifically alter decisions such as these. But it does change
the whole setting in which the problem of municipal-special district conflict
arises. Municipal home rule authority now has constitutional sanction.
Legislative diminution of that authority must be effected through procedures
specified in sections 6(g), (h), and (i), or through identification of the subject
matter as not pertaining to home rule government and affairs under section 6(a).
In this setting the claim of the special districts appears to be weakened. Al-
though I have found no legislative history one way or the other on this issue,
there seems to be no good reason why, absent legislative restraints enacted in
the required manner, home rule units should not regulate the actions of special
districts as they do other actions affecting their residents pursuant to the powers
granted in section 6(a).
58. The court's original opinion was modified on rehearing after the City of Des Plaines
in its petition for rehearing reminded the court that no evidence had been admitted in
the trial court on the issue of the reasonableness and effect of the ordinance.
59. 63 Ill.2d at 258, 347 N.E.2d at 717.
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necessity for this action was incorrect both as a matter of consti-
tutional law and social policy.
Along with obvious constitutional authority, the city in
Metropolitan Sanitary District relied on the court's previous
statements in Pollution Control Board, Ampersand, and
Mulligan for authority in support of its right to legislate concur-
rently with the state on environmental matters. Nevertheless, the
court specifically rejected the city's position and instead restated
the position it announced in Carlson ° that its previous statement
allowing concurrent jurisdiction was dicta.
The dissenting justices strenuously argued that "it is impera-
tive that we do not continue to deprive units of local government,
especially home rule units, of the right to legislate in the area
most essential to the health and welfare of the inhabitants and
in an area where there has been for many years recognized author-
ity of local government units to legislate."'" The language of the
constitution and the intent of its framers" strongly support the
position taken by the dissenters.
The Illinois Supreme Court during its September 1976 term
finally firmly ruled on the issue of whether home rule units may
legislate on environmental matters. In City of Des Plaines v. Chi-
cago and Northwestern Railway,3 the court held that home rule
units could not regulate on environmental matters because envi-
ronmental problems were outside the grant of authority conferred
on home rule units by article VII section 6(a). This decision re-
versed the appellate court" holding that the City of Des Plaines
had the authority to pass and enforce a noise ordinance. The
court again bypassed the preemption question which had been of
crucial importance in earlier cases.
The facts in Chicago and Northwestern Railway were not in
serious dispute. The City of Des Plaines is a home rule unit that
had passed a noise ordinance regulating unreasonable noises
within the city. The local noise ordinance had the same standards
60. Id. at 260, 347 N.E.2d at 718.
61. Id. at 262, 347 N.E.2d at 719.
62. See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
63. 65 I1.2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (Ward, C.J., Ryan and Goldenhersh, J.J. dissenting)
(1976).
64. Des Plaines v. Chicago Northwestern Ry., 30 Ill.App.3d 944, 332 N.E.2d 596 (1st
Dist. 1975).
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as subsequent Illinois Environmental Protection Agency regula-
tions.5  The defendant railroad operated a yard that had locomo-
tives which had exceeded the city's prescribed noise levels on
twenty-seven occasions. Therefore, the plaintiff charged the de-
fendant with a violation of its ordinances. The evidence at trial
showed that the yard was wholly located within the city and the
measurement of the noise level was only at points within the
municipal boundaries.
The supreme court held that the City of Des Plaines did not
have the authority to pass its noise ordinance. The basis of the
court's decision was that the regulation of noise was not a power
or function pertaining to a home rule unit's "government and
affairs" within the meaning of section 6(a). The court reasoned:
While noise pollution may initially appear to be a matter of local
concern, an analysis of the problem reveals that noise pollution
is a matter requiring regional, if not statewide, standards and
controls. As with air or water pollution which may emanate from
a small, local source and then travel outward to foul an entire
area or region, noise pollution also extends beyond its source,
although on a more limited scale than air or water pollution.
Local municpalities often border upon one another. While cer-
tain categories of noise pollution may be confined within the
boundaries of one municipality, such as an irate motorist sound-
ing his horn, other categories are not so limited. A railroad yard
or industrial district located on the boundary of one municpality
will obviously affect other municipalities with noise pollution
emissions. Of particular relevance is the question of noise emis-
sions from trains in transit which may pass through numerous
municipalities en route to their destination."
This conclusion overlooks the local nature of the facts before
the court. In Chicago and Northwestern Railway, the offensive
noise started in Des Plaines in a railroad yard wholly within the
city's border. The clamor had bothered Des Plaines residents in
the early morning hours when locomotives were started for the
day. The sounds were measured only in Des Plaines. A simple
situation involving a noisy neighbor was presented to the Illinois
65. Regulations had been adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency prior to the
date of the violations at issue in this case, however, the regulations were not effective until
after a grace period. The violations at issue occurred during the grace period.
66. 65 1ll.2d at 5, 357 N.E.2d at 435.
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Supreme Court. The court's finding that this limited noise pollu-
tion problem was not a matter of local concern was not based on
the facts. While attempting to solve the potential problem that
could occur if, for example, Des Plaines brought an action against
a Mt. Prospect business for noise starting in Mt. Prospect that
travelled to Des Plaines and exceeded Des Plaines noise levels,
while complying with Mt. Prospect law, the Illinois Supreme
Court destroyed the power of Illinois municpalities to solve local
noise problems.
Chief Justice Ward and Justices Ryan and Goldenhirsch filed
a dissent to the majority opinion." The dissent authored by Jus-
tice Ryan argued that the majority failed to consider whether it
was even possible for all the state's pollution problems to be
policed by the state Environmental Protection Agency. Also, the
dissenters offered their opinion that it will be absolutely impossi-
ble for the EPA to eliminate the offending noises from every train
whistle, siren and motor vehicle. Moreover, Justice Ryan pointed
out that the majority opinion has invalidated every ordinance
regulating horn honking, tire squealing and noisy mufflers. The
broad grant of regulatory power conferred on home rule units by
section 6(a) has now been construed to forbid home rule units
from controlling even the simplest sound problem.
Mr. Chief Justice Ward also filed his own dissenting opinion in
which he succinctly explained the problem now facing local gov-
ernments:
However, I, too, consider, especially in the case of home rule
units, that local governmental units generally should be able to
act concurrently with the State in the environmental protection
field. There will be instances where difficult problems may be
presented, but the problems certainly would not be beyond solu-
tion. Illustrating the anomalous consequences of the majority's
position, the City of Chicago, a home rule unit and the railroad
center of the United States, is utterly without authority to act
to protect its citizens from environmental harm caused by rail-
roads, or for that matter, caused by anything or anyone else.
Every small village as well as every large city must depend for
protection solely on the State's interest in their environmental
problems and the adequacy of its protective action."
67. Id. at 8, 357 N.E.2d at 436.
68. Id. at 9-10, 357 N.E.2d at 437-38.
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Can this be the result intended by the framers of the 1970
constitution who attempted to confer broad power onto local gov-
ernments?
The only conclusion that can now be drawn is that the power
to regulate granted to home rule units by article VII, section 6(a)
of the 1970 constitution will be narrowly construed, especially in
environmental matters.6" It is hoped that in the future the justices
of the supreme court will reverse this trend, read the constitution,
study the intent of its framers, and restore the constitutional
grant of power to home rule units.70
69. Two other supreme court cases were decided during the September 1976 term
and a review of these cases is relevant to any attempt to understand the present state of
home rule authority. In Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill.2d 10, __ N.E.2d
- (1976), the court took a different approach to a similar issue. The issue before the
court was whether an ordinance levying a municipal admission tax was valid. The local
racetrack challenged the ordinance on grounds similar to the challenges raised by the
railroad in the Des Plaines decision. The race track first contended that the state's exten-
sive regulation had preempted the field of horse racing control. The court held that no
preemption occurred because the Racing Acts were adopted prior to the constitution.
Thus, preemption by these acts was not possible according to numerous previous deci-
sions. In addition, the court held that the failure of the General Assembly to act pursuant
to article VII, section 6(g) proved that no preemption occurred. This preemption reasoning
contradicts the preemption reasoning used by the court in the environmental cases.
The next issue in Fox Valley Trotting Club was whether the taxation of horse racing
was an activity pertaining to Cicero's government and affairs within the meaning of article
VII, section 6(a). The court held that the power to levy this amusement tax was within
the power conferred by section 6(a). The court carefully explained that this case dealt with
the power to tax which is separate and distinct from the power to regulate. Then, the court
held that article VII, section 6(a) confers upon home rule units a broad taxing power and
upheld the city's tax. Thus, the supreme court in this tax case was willing to faithfully
follow the intent of the framers of the constitution to grant substantial power to home rule
units.
During its September term, the Illinois Supreme Court also decided Bulk Terminals
Co. v. EPA, 65 Ill.2d 31, 357 N.E.2d 430 (1976). The primary issue presented was the
problem of a company that first was prosecuted for a violation of a home rule environ-
mental ordinance and then was charged by the Environmental Protection Agency in
another proceeding. The answer to this question was deferred. The court avoided the
problem by deciding the case on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In
any event, the dual prosecution problem in environmental areas is probably moot since
home rule units no longer have the power to legislate on environmental problems.
70. Since the supreme court has not delineated any real standards to govern its future
decisions and the divided court will soon be changing, the future is difficult to predict.
